Failed state

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A failed state is a political body that has been destroyed to the point where the basic conditions and responsibilities of sovereign governments no longer function properly (see also the fragile state and the collapse of the state). Likewise, when a nation weakens and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of total government destruction. Funds for Peace indicate a state of failure has the following characteristics:

• Loss of control over its territory, or monopoly over the use of legitimate physical forces in it
• Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions
• Inability to provide public services
• Inability to interact with other countries as a full member of the international community

The general characteristics of a failing country including the central government are very weak or ineffective, thus unable to raise taxes or other support, and have little practical control over most of its territory and hence no provision of public services. When this happens, widespread corruption and crime, the intervention of non-state actors, the emergence of refugees and unintentional population movement, and sharp economic downturn may occur.

The level of government control required to avoid being perceived as a failed state varies greatly between the authorities. Moreover, the statement that a country has "failed" is generally controversial and, when authoritatively created, can bring significant geopolitical consequences.

Video Failed state

Definitions and issues

According to Max Weber's political theories, a state is defined as maintaining a monopoly over the use of legitimate physical forces within its borders. When this is broken (eg, through the presence of dominant warlords, paramilitary groups, armed gangs, or terrorism), the existence of the country becomes doubtful, and the country becomes a failed state. It is difficult to determine whether the government maintains a "monopoly over the use of legitimate power", which includes the problem of "legitimate" definition, meaning it is unclear when exactly a country can be said to "fail".

The question of legitimacy can be solved by understanding what Weber wants by it. Weber explained that only countries that have the means of production are necessary for physical violence. This means that the state does not require legitimacy to achieve monopoly because it has the means of violence ( de facto ), but will need it if necessary use it ( de jure ).

Typically, this term means that the state has become ineffective and can not enforce its laws uniformly or provide basic goods and services for its citizens due to (high) crime rates, insurrection, extreme political corruption, impenetrable and ineffective bureaucracies. , ineffectiveness of the judiciary, military interference in politics, and the cultural situation in which traditional leaders hold greater powers than states over a particular region. Other perceptual factors may be involved. A derivative concept of "failed city" has also been launched, based on the idea that while the state can function in general, policies at the substrate level may collapse in terms of infrastructure, economy and social policy. Certain regions or cities may even be beyond the control of the state, becoming part of a state not controlled by the government.

There is no real consensus on the definition of "failed state"; the subjective nature of the indicators used to measure state failure has led to an ambiguous understanding of the term. Some experts focus on the capacity and effectiveness of governments to determine whether a country fails or not. Other indices such as the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index underscore the democratic character of state institutions to determine their failure rates. Finally, other experts focus their arguments on the legitimacy of the state, on the nature of the country, on the growth of criminal violence in a country, on the extractive economic institutions, or on the capacity of the state to control its territory. Robert H. Bates refers to the failure of the state as a "state explosion", in which the state transforms "a tool of nationality" and the state effectively loses its monopoly over the means of violence.

As part of the debate on the definition of state failure, Charles T. Call (2010) attempts to abandon the concept of state failure at once; as he argues, it promotes an unclear understanding of what state failure means. Indeed, one of the major contributions to theorizing "failed states" is the "skeleton" developed by Call (2010). This framework is built on previous criticism (2008) on 'state failure', as a concept used as a catcher-all term for diverse countries with various problems and as a basis and explanation for the formulation of universal policies. This dismantles the concept of "state failure" focusing on three loopholes that the state can not provide when it is in a process of failure: capacity, when state institutions lack the ability to effectively deliver basic goods and services to their inhabitants; security, when the state can not provide security to its population under the threat of armed groups; and legitimacy, when "most of the political and political elites reject the rules governing power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth." The "gap framework" seems more useful than other definitions. Instead of trying to gauge the failure rate of a country, the gap framework provides a useful three-dimensional scope for analyzing the interaction between government and people in the state in a more analytical way. Calls do not necessarily indicate that the countries that suffer from the challenges of the three gaps must be identified as failed states; but instead, presents the idea of ​​a gap as an alternative to the concept of overall state failure. Although Call recognizes that the gap concept itself has its limits, as it often claims to face two or more of the gap challenges, its conceptual proposition presents a useful way of identifying more appropriate challenges in society and policy prescriptions that are more likely to be effective for external actors and international to implement.

Further criticism for the way in which the concept of 'failed state' has been understood and operationalized is brought into the study by Morten BÃÆ'¸ÃÆ'Â¥s and Kathleen M. Jennings who, taking five case studies - Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, and the territory of the Niger Delta in Nigeria - argued that "the use of the label 'failed state' is essentially political, and primarily based on Western perceptions of Western security and interests". They continue to suggest that Western policy makers attribute labels' to fail 'to countries where' recession and informalization of the state are perceived to be a threat to Western interests. Furthermore, this shows a hypocritical approach on behalf of Western policymakers, due to the fact that the characteristics that would cause certain countries to be labeled as failing to be accepted in other countries where these characteristics correspond to Western interests. In fact, "the feature of this state function is not only acceptable, but also to some extent facilitated, because it creates an enabling environment for business and international capital.These cases are not 'branded fails'.

Relevant contributions to failed state fields and their attributes were made by J. Goldstone in his paper The Road to State Failure . He defines a failed state as one that has lost effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness means the ability to perform state functions such as providing security or levying taxes. Legitimacy means the support of important population groups. A state that maintains one of these two aspects does not fail like that; However it is in great danger of failing immediately if nothing is done. He identifies five possible paths to state failure:

1. Escalation of communal group conflict (ethnic or religious). Example: Syria, Somalia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Iraq, Yemen, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan
2. Country predictions (corrupt corrupt or crony resources at the expense of other groups). Example: Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Brazil, Philippines, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, South Africa, North Korea, Saudi Arabia
3. Regional rebellion or guerrillas. Examples: Libya, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Turkey, Congo, Colombia, Vietnam
4. The democratic collapse (leading to civil war or coup d'etat). Examples: Nigeria, Madagascar, Nepal
5. Succession or crisis reform in authoritarian countries. Example: Indonesia under Suharto, Iran under the Shah, Soviet Union under Gorbachev

Although Goldstone identified the path to state failure, he quickly warned about simplifying the problem. Often (re) -good building of legitimacy or effectiveness implies a trade-off with other aspects of the state. Because these countries lose either of the two pillars for stability, it is dangerous to start a trade-off as it takes time to rebuild the confidence of the population. Although the failure of the state has been studied for decades by many scholars, it remains a contested concept vulnerable to political, ideological and economic agendas.

Maps Failed state

Measurement

Methods of measuring state failure are generally divided into quantitative and qualitative approaches.

Quantitative Approach

Quantitative measurements of state failures mean the creation of indexes and ratings underlying certain indicators. To measure the failure of the country Fragile States Index (FSI), previously called the Failed States Index , Fragility Index (FI) and (SFI) is very important. However, a number of other indices are generally used to describe the country's weaknesses, often focusing on the level of state development. Examples are: Freedom House Index (FHI), Human Development Index (HDI) or World Bank Governance Indicator . In addition, the regional evaluation may provide concrete details on, inter alia, democratic levels such as the Democratic Development Report in Latin America ( Informe de desarrollo democracyÃÆ'¡tico de AmÃÆ'Â © rica Latina ). However, the Fragile States Index has received considerable attention since its first publication in 2005. Edited by the Foreign Policy magazine, the ratings examine 178 countries based on analytical research from the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) Fund for Peace.

The Fragile States Index publishes its eleventh annual report by 2015, prepared by the Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy Magazine . The index categorizes countries in four categories, with variations in each category. Category Red standby dark, Orange alert, Stable in yellow, and Green Sustainable.

FSI's total score is from 120, and by 2015 there are 178 countries ranking. Initially, the FSI ranked only 75 countries in 2005. FSI uses two criteria by which a country is eligible for inclusion in the list: firstly, the state should be a member state of the United Nations, and secondly, there must be a significant sample size of the content and data available for the country to allow for meaningful analysis. There are three groups: social, economic and political with a total of twelve indicators.

Social indicators:

• Demographic pressure
• Refugees or internally displaced persons
• Group complaints
• Human flight and brain drain

Economic indicators:

• Uneven economic development
• Poverty and economic downturn

Political and military indicators:

• Legitimacy of country
• Public services
• Human rights and rule of law
• Security tools
• The fractionated elite
• External intervention

Each indicator is calculated for 10, adds up to a total of 120. However, to add up to 120, the indicator score is rounded up or down to the nearest one. In the 2015 Index, South Sudan is ranked number one, Somalia number two, and Central African Republic number three. Finland is currently the most stable and sustainable country on the list.

While it is important to note that the FSI is used in many parts of the study and makes the state categorization more pragmatic, it often receives a lot of criticism for several reasons. First, it does not include the Human Development Index to achieve a final score, but it focuses on agencies to measure what is often also considered human aspects for development. Secondly, it parallels the vulnerability or vulnerability of a country with backwardness. This comparison first assumes that backwardness (economy) creates vulnerability, assuming that if a country is "developed" it is stable or sustainable. Third, measure the failure (or success) of a country without including the progress of other regions beyond the scope of 12 indicators, so as not to include important development measures such as decreasing child mortality rates, and increasing access to clean water sources. and drugs, among others. However, when discussing failed states, it is important to mention FSI not only for its use by governments, organizations, educators and analysts, but also because it provides an assessment measure that tries to address the problems that cause threats, both domestically and internationally..

Qualitative Approach

The qualitative approach includes the theoretical framework. Typically, this type of measurement uses a stage model to allow for state categorization. In three to five stages, the researcher shows the failure of the state as a process. Leading researchers, among others, are Robert I. Rotberg in Anglo-American and Ulrich Schneckener in the German sphere.

The stage model Ulrich Schneckener (2006) defines three core elements, violent monopoly, legitimacy and rule of law. This typology is based on first security logic and thus, shows the relevance of a violent monopoly compared to the other two while at the same time acting as a prerequisite for a functioning state. The four types of statehood are: (1) consolidation and consolidation of the state, (2) weak states, (3) failures and (4) the state collapses/fails. The first type is directed to a functioning state; all the core functions of the state function in the long run. In weaker countries, the monopoly of power is intact, but the other two regions show a serious deficit. Failed states have no monopoly of power, while other regions function at least in part. Finally, the state collapses or fails to be dominated by a parastatal structure characterized by actors trying to create a certain internal order, but the state can not adequately serve three core elements.

Both research approaches show some irregularities. While the quantitative approach lacks transparency about its indicators and its balance in the country's evaluation process, the qualitative approach shows a different diversity of focus. One major difference is the question of whether all stages must be taken continuously or if a state can pass through a single phase. Schneckener emphasized that his model should not be interpreted as a stage model because, in his opinion, the state does not have to undergo every stage. The Robert I. Rotberg model underlies ordinal logic and thus implies that the process of state failure is a series of chronological phases.

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Theoretical mechanisms for country development

Development of the country through the making of war

Charles Tilly (1985) argues that the making of war is an indispensable aspect of the development of the state in Europe through the following interdependent functions:

• Warfare - the ruler removes outside rivals (requires the building of military forces and supportive bureaucracy)
• State taking - rulers eliminating internal rivals and establishing control over their territory (requiring the building of police and bureaucratic forces)
• Protection - the authorities bring benefits to their clients by removing their external competitors and guaranteeing their rights (requires building courts and representative assemblies)
• Extracts extract more taxes from the subject (requires the development of tax collection apparatuses and exsterquers)

Tilly summarizes this connection in the famous phrase: "The war made the country, and the war state."

Similarly, Herbst (1990) adds that war may be the only opportunity to strengthen extraction capabilities by forcing authorities to risk their political lives for additional income and forcing subjects to agree to pay more taxes. This is also important for the development of the country because the increase in income will not return to its original level even after the end of the war. Contrary to European countries, however, it also shows that most Third World countries have no external threats and do not foment interstate wars, implying that these countries are unlikely to take similar steps in the future. " Nation-building "by developed countries Beginner's Guide to Nation's Development ) by comparing successful interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) with nation-building efforts which failed in Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001) where the US lost thousands of lives for ten years and spent more than a trillion dollars without realizing the central goal of nation-building.

Promoting development through foreign help

Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2013) analyzed the systematic failures of failed state development. They define "state administrative capabilities for implementation" as a key aspect of state development, and discover the mechanisms in which states fail to trip without regard to the decades of tried development practices, billions of dollars spent, and suspected "progress". These countries adopt the following techniques that cause them to weaken:

1. systemic isomorphic mimicry - disguise state dysfunction with a view that mimics a functional state system.
2. early load loading - limited capacity status is filled with "unrealistic expectations."

Given the fact that many of these countries will need centuries to reach the capabilities of developed countries, they suggest creating "context-specific institutions", promoting "gradual reform process", and setting "realistic expectations" to achieve goals. substantial development.

Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle (2006) recognize the controversy over the effects of foreign aid that have grown in recent years. They argue that while there are calls for an increase in major African aid efforts by the international community, this will actually create what they call "the paradox of aid agencies". This paradox is formed because the large cash contribution that Western countries give to African countries has created institutions that are "less responsible to its citizens and under less pressure to maintain popular legitimacy." They mentioned that gradual decline in aid could help develop long-term institutions, as evidenced by US efforts in Korea after the Cold War.

Berman, Eli, Felter, Shapiro, and Trolan (2013) also found similar evidence to support the paradox, stating that the great US aid effort on African agriculture only resulted in further conflicts between citizens. In particular, small investments such as grants for schools have been shown to reduce violence compared to large investments, creating "incentives to capture economic rent through violence."

Furthermore, Binyavanga Wainaina (2009) likens Western aid to colonization, where countries believe that large cash contributions to spur the African economy will lead to political development and less violence. In fact, this cash contribution does not invest in Africa's economic, political and most important growth, socially.

Neotrusteeship

James Fearon and David Laitin (2004) argue that the problem of failed states can be overcome through a system of "neotrusteeship," which they compare with "postmodern imperialism." Fearon and Laitin's idea of ​​neotrusteeship involves a combination of international and domestic organizations seeking to rebuild the country. Fearon and Laitin begin with the assumption that the failed state consists of the problem of collective action. Countries that fail to impose negative externalities on other international systems, such as refugees displaced by war. It will be clean both for the international system if countries are working to develop and rebuild failed states. However, the intervention is very expensive, and no country has a strong enough incentive to act to solve the failed state problem. Therefore, international cooperation is needed to solve this collective action problem.

Fearon and Laitin identified four major problems for achieving collective action to intervene in failed states:

1. Recruitment - invites countries to participate and pay for interventions
2. Coordination - provides good communication between all peacekeeping countries
3. Accountability - ensuring that every peacekeeping country that commits human rights violations is responsible
4. Exit - has several mechanisms for peacekeeping nations to withdraw

Fearon and Laitin proposed several solutions to this problem. To solve the recruitment problem, they argue for having a strong state with security interests in a country that fails to lead a peacekeeping operation and serves a single point role. Having one country leading a peacekeeping operation will also help solve the coordination problem. The empowerment of UN agencies to investigate human rights violations would solve the problem of accountability. Finally, forcing countries that fail to provide funds for peacekeeping operations after a few years can reduce the incentives of peacekeeping troops to exit. Fearon and Laitin believe that multilateral interventions that solve the four collective action issues above will be more effective in rebuilding failed states through neotrusteeship.

Autonomous Recovery

Jeremy Weinstein disagrees that peacekeeping is necessary to rebuild a failed state, arguing that it is often better to let a failed state recover. Weinstein worried that international intervention could prevent the state from developing strong institutions and internal capabilities. One of Weinstein's key arguments is that war leads to peace. By this, it means that the peace treaties imposed by the international community tend to be frozen in place of power gaps that do not reflect reality. Weinstein believes that such a situation makes the country more prepared for future wars, whereas if war is allowed to play on the one hand to win convincingly, future wars will be much less likely. Weinstein also claimed that the war led to the development of strong state institutions. Weinstein borrowed from Charles Tilly to make this argument, stating that war requires a great expansion in the ability of the state, so that more stable and capable countries will win the war and survive in the international system through a process similar to natural selection. Weinstein used evidence from Uganda's successful recovery following the guerrilla victory in the civil war, Eritrea's forced separation from Ethiopia, and development in Somaliland and Puntland - Somalia's autonomous region - to support his claim. Weinstein noted that the lack of external intervention could lead to mass killings and other atrocities, but he stressed that preventing mass killings should be weighed against the next long-term state loss of capacity.

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Capture trap from failed state

The capability trap means that developing countries are very slow in expanding the capacity of the state even in the contemporary world, which is also the core problem of failed states. Many countries remain trapped in low productivity conditions that are often called "poverty traps." Economic growth is only one aspect of development; Another key development dimension is the expansion of the state's administrative capabilities, the ability of governments to influence the course of events by implementing policies and programs. Capability traps close the space for new things, setting the best-practice agenda fixed as the basis of failed state evaluations. Therefore local agencies are excluded from the process of building their own state, implicitly destroying the value creation ideas of local leaders and frontline workers.

Matt, Lant, and Woolcock from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government proposed an approach called "Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)", to release the capability trap. Given that many development initiatives fail to improve performance because they promote isomorphic mimicry , PDIA focuses on solving locally nominated and prioritized performance problems from failed states. This involves the pursuit of development interventions involving a large pool of local agents to ensure that political reforms can be supported and practically practicable.

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Promoting democracy and fighting terrorism in failed states

Promoting democracy in a post-conflict and failed country

Larry Diamond (2006) argues that countries that are weak and fail to cause separate problems for the promotion of democracy. In these countries, the challenge is not only to suppress authoritarian state leaders to surrender power but to find out how to regenerate legitimate power in the first place.

There are three different types of cases, and each of these three types of cases requires a special type of strategy for the promotion of democracy:

1. Post-conflict countries emerging from external or civil wars. Many of these countries have been in Africa - South Africa, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia. Some have been in Latin America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, much of Central America), in Asia (eg Cambodia and one is now Sri Lanka), and in the Middle East (Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq);
2. Countries that are in the midst of an ongoing civil war or violent conflict, where central state authorities have largely collapsed, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo;

In general, order is the most important prerequisite for the promotion of democracy, which relies heavily on formal democratic mechanisms, especially elections to promote post-conflict state development. In the absence of an effective state, there are basically three possibilities: If there is a civil war and rebel forces eventually win, then the void may be filled by rebel soldiers and political movements because it establishes control over the state; secondly, there might be a patchwork of warlords and soldiers, with no real central state (as in Somalia) or just a very weak one. In this situation, the conflict does not really end, but may be diminishing in a decentralized mode, like in Afghanistan today; A third possibility is that an international actor or coalition of actors stepped inside to form a temporary political and military authority. This could be individual countries, coalitions, individual nations under a thin layer of coalition, or the United Nations that acts through the formal architecture of the post-conflict UN mission.

Transnational crimes and terrorism

According to US Justice Court Attorney Dan E. Stigall, "the international community is faced with increasing transnational crime rates where criminal acts in one country have an impact in another country or even some other." Drug trafficking, trafficking, computer crime, terrorism, other crimes may involve actors operating outside the borders of a country that may have a significant interest in stopping the activity being questioned and prosecuting the perpetrators ".

A study from the Cligendael Center for Strategic Studies explains why states that are subject to failure serve as protection (used to plan, implement, support, and finance activities) for terrorist organizations. When the government does not know about the existence of the organization or if it is unable to weaken or remove the organization, the sanctuary is called the "Terrorist Black Hole". However, in addition to the government's weakness, there needs to be a "Terrorist Comparative Advantage" present for an area considered a "Terrorist Black Hole". According to research, social tensions, inheritance from civil conflict, geography, corruption and policy failure, as well as external factors contribute to the weakness of the government. Its comparative advantages are: religion and ethnicity, the heritage of civil conflict, geography, economic opportunity, economic backwardness and regional stimulation. Only a combination of two factors (government weakness and Terrorist Comparative Advantage) explains which territory terrorists use as a refuge.

Research by James Piazza of Pennsylvania State University found evidence that countries were affected by the experience of state failure and resulted in more terrorist attacks. Contemporary transnational criminals "take advantage of globalization, trade liberalization and detonate new technologies to perpetrate multiple crimes and move money, goods, services and people instantly for the purpose of perpetrating violence for political purposes".

Contribute to previous research on this issue, Tiffiany Howard looks at the different dimensions of the relationship between state failure and terrorism, based on evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that "citizens fail to be drawn to political violence because conditions are worsening in these countries." Focusing on citizen decision-making patterns, it is suggested that "individuals living in a country fail to be attracted to political violence because the system is broken - the state has failed in its task". These findings are based on empirical evidence using barometer survey data. This individual-level approach, different from previous studies focused on the attractiveness of failed states for terrorists and guerrillas, found that "states fail to threaten the survival of individuals, which ultimately drives them to acquire real political and economic resources through other means, which including the use of political violence ". These findings have significant implications for the international community, such as the fact that "this pattern of deprivation makes individuals in these countries more vulnerable to the influence of internationally sponsored terrorist groups." As a result, the failed state is a breeding ground for terrorists, which then exports their radical ideology to other parts of the world to create terrorist threats all over the world "

The relationship between state failure (and its characteristics) and terrorism, however, is not unanimously accepted in the scientific literature. The study by Alberto Abadie, who sees the determinants of state-level terrorism, suggests that "terrorist risk is not significantly higher for poorer countries, once the effects of country-specific characteristics such as the degree of political freedom are taken into account." In fact, as argued, "political freedom is shown to explain terrorism, but it does so in a non-monotonic way: countries in some medium-range political freedoms prove to be more vulnerable to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with regimes which is very authoritarian ". While poverty and low levels of political freedom are not the main characteristics of failed states, they remain important. For this reason, Abadie's research is a strong critique of the idea that there is a connection between state failure and terrorism. This relationship is also questioned by other scholars, such as Corinne Graff, who argues that 'there is no strong empirical relationship between poverty and terrorist attacks'.

In addition, "the problems of the undermined states and transnational crime create unchallenged meetings that are uniquely challenging.When a criminal operates outside the territory of the violated state, the breached state may ordinarily appeal to the country from which the criminals operate to take such as to prosecute domestic offenders or extradite offenders so that they can face punishment in a violated state, even in situations where the government is unable (or unwilling) to cooperate in criminal arrest or prosecution, the offended state has some options for other avenues ".

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Critics of the concept

The term "failed state" has faced criticism along two major strands. The former argue that the term is appropriate for over-generalization, bringing together different governance issues among diverse nations, and without taking into account variations in governance within countries. The second relates to the political application of the term to justify military intervention and state-building based on Western state models.

Olivier Nay, William Easterly and Laura Freschi complained that the concept of state failure "lacks a coherent definition", with an index incorporating various state performance indicators with arbitrary weights to achieve unclear and aggregated state vulnerability measurements. Call (2008) argues that the label 'failed state' has been applied so widely that it is effectively considered useless. Because there is little consensus on how to define failed states, the characteristics typically used to identify failed states are numerous and diverse, ranging from human rights abuses, poverty, corruption to demographic pressures. This means that very different countries are categorized together as failed (or failing) states. This can hide the complexity of the specific weaknesses identified in each country and produce a one-size-fits-all approach that typically focuses on strengthening the country's capacity for orders. In addition, the use of the term 'failed state' has been used by some foreign powers as justification for attacking a country, or determining a certain prescriptive set of foreign policy objectives. After 2001, Call noted that the United States declared that the failed state was one of the greatest security threats facing the country, based on the assumption that countries with weak or non-existent state institutions would provide a safe haven for terrorists, and act. as a breeding ground for extremism.

Call (2008) states that instead of branding states as failing states, they can be categorized into more relevant and understandable terms. For example, 'collapsing state' would refer to a country where the state apparatus is completely destroyed and no more for several months. This applies only to countries where there are absolutely no basic functions of the working state, and non-state actors are carrying out these tasks. 'Weak states' can be used for countries where informal institutions do more public services and goods delivery than formal state institutions. The war-torn country may not work because of the conflict, but this does not necessarily mean the country is collapsing. Rotburg argued that all countries failed to experience some form of armed conflict. However, the challenge to the state can differ greatly depending on the type of armed conflict, and whether it covers the country as a whole and a large area, or is specifically focused on one regional region. Another type of state that has traditionally been under the umbrella of the 'failed state' can be an 'authoritarian state'. While authoritarian leaders may rule by force, they can fend off opposition once in power and thus ensure there is little violence in their regime. Call (2008) argues that the circumstances and challenges facing state-building in such regimes are very different from those proposed in a country in civil war. These four alternative definitions highlight different circumstances that can cause countries to be categorized under the umbrella of the 'failed state', and the danger of adopting a prescriptive policy approach suitable for all very different situations.

Pakistan has been used as an example of how variations in governance intrastate undermine the concept of state failure. The British writer Anatol Lieven draws the distinction between "completely failed and failed" states in Sub-Saharan Africa with countries in South Asia, whose rulers say "do not traditionally exercise direct control over... most of their territory and always face armed resistance continuously somewhere or another ". Although he admits that Pakistan may be considered "failing" when compared to Western European industrialized countries, he criticized how commentators used the War in North-West Pakistan to call Pakistan a "failure".

In addition to previous criticisms of the concept of 'failed state', Alex Maroya argues that the term 'fail' is limited in its approach. He suggested that "it is a state model based on a sovereign central government, a vast central government that has been largely unsuccessful in the world, and the border regions of the former European empire in particular." Rather than producing a country that reflects the Western system, these countries must develop their own state model, which does not resort to coercion as a form of rule. The author, in fact, argues for the concept of a more decentralized state, not a rigid border that has caused conflict and instability. In 2003, Maroya argued that so-called "failed states" might be better under decentralized governance. Rather than simply labeling these countries as 'failing' and almost 'damned' for perpetual conflict, the literature should focus on alternatives such as different levels of government and regional integration. In other words, "the discourse of international relations needs to shift away from talks about 'state failure' and toward a critical understanding of the type of state that has developed in previous border areas."

This concept has been criticized for being teleological, ahistorical and reflecting the western bias of what constitutes a successful state. Inherent in the concept of a failed state is the association assumed with terrorism and other transnational threats. They are sometimes described as incubators for international terrorism.

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See also

• Funds for Peace
• Rogue state
• Ochlocracy
• The Fragile State Index
• Stabilization of fragile status
• State Crisis Research Center
• Strict non-state actor
• Pariah State
• Banana republic
• Anarchy example of the collapse of the country
• Mafia status
• Social collapse
• List of ongoing armed conflicts

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References

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External links

• "State failed" and international law - Daniel ThÃÆ'¼rer, International Review of the Red Cross (December 12, 1999)

For a critical approach, see:

• GSDRC, Applied Knowledge Service Guide: Fragile Country, Chapter 3
• Why a failed country should not be the fear of our greatest national security. By Stewart Patrick. The Washington Post , April 15, 2011.
• Global Black Spots: Threats of a Gov- ernmental Government. By Dr. Bartosz Hieronymous Stanis? Awski. National Strategy Forum Review . Summer 2011. Volume 20. Issue 3.
• The Black Spots Global Approach (White Book). By Dr. Bartosz Hieronymous Stanis? Awski and John A. Conway.

Source of the article : Wikipedia